Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
辽宁省大连市人民政府办公厅


大连市人民政府办公厅关于印发《大连市残疾人就业保障金征缴管理办法》的通知


各区、市、县人民政府，市政府各委办局、各直属机构，各有关单位：
　　经市政府同意，现将市财政局、市地税局及市残联联合制定的《大连市残疾人就业保障金征缴管理办法》印发给你们，请认真贯彻执行。

二〇〇八年七月二日

大连市残疾人就业保障金征缴管理办法

　　根据省政府《关于征收残疾人就业保障金问题的通知》（辽政发〔2003〕23号）、《辽宁省人民政府关于调整残疾人就业保障金征收标准的通知》（辽政发〔2006〕15号）及《大连市按比例分散安置残疾人就业规定》等文件精神，结合我市实际，特制定本办法。
　　一、征缴范围
　　大连市行政区域内的机关、企事业单位、社会团体和民办非企业单位、中央部属及外省市驻连单位等用人单位（以下简称用人单位），均须按本单位在职职工总数1.7%的比例安排残疾人就业，不足50人的单位，原则上应安置1名残疾人就业，安排未达到比例的，依法缴纳残疾人就业保障金（以下简称保障金）。
　　大连市各级财政部门全部拨款的行政单位和由财政全部补助或部分补助的事业单位，由同级财政部门代扣保障金。
　　各类企业（含省属及以上企业）、民办非企业单位以及以经营收入为主要支出来源的事业单位和社会团体，由地税部门按属地原则及现行税收管理体制统一代征保障金。地税部门有权对各用人单位缴纳保障金情况进行检查、处理。
　　其他单位由市残疾人就业服务中心负责征收保障金。
　　二、征缴标准
　　（一）具体标准
　　各用人单位每少安排1名残疾人就业，应按统计部门公布的本地区职工年平均工资缴纳保障金。按规定就业比例安排残疾人不足1人的单位，根据实际差额比例缴纳保障金。
　　保障金计算公式：（用人单位在职职工总数×1.7%-用人单位已安排残疾职工总数）×本地区职工年平均工资=应缴纳保障金。
　　（二）相关概念界定
　　1、用人单位在职职工：是指在用人单位生产或工作并取得劳动报酬的各类人员，包括在岗职工和其他从业人员等。
　　2、在职职工总数：是指用人单位全年月平均职工人数。未参加年审用人单位的在职职工总数由残疾人就业服务机构参照政府相关部门的统计数据核定。
　　3、已安排残疾职工：是指在国家法定劳动年龄内，持有《中华人民共和国残疾人证》，与用人单位依法签订1年（含1年）以上劳动合同，享有平等工资、福利待遇和基本社会保险的职工。
　　4、本地区职工年平均工资：依据市或区市县统计部门公布的数据确定。
　　三、征缴办法
　　（一）征缴时间
　　保障金按年计算、按年征缴。当年应缴纳的保障金，审核期为次年5-6月，征缴期为次年7月；2007年度应缴纳的保障金审核期为2008年6-7月，征缴期为2008年7月。
　　（二）审核认定
　　各级残疾人就业服务机构负责用人单位残疾人按比例就业情况的审核认定。市级财政拨款单位、市地税直属局、保税区地税局及高新园区地税局管辖的用人单位，由市残疾人就业服务中心负责审核；其他用人单位按属地原则，由各区市县残疾人就业服务所负责审核。
　　每年审核期内，用人单位须携带用人单位工资手册（或工资明细表）、用人单位社会保险缴费明细表，到市或所在地残疾人就业服务机构办理审核，并填写《残疾人按比例就业单位登记表》；已安置残疾人的用人单位，还须携带用人单位与残疾职工依法签订的1年（含1年）以上《劳动合同》、中国残联制发的《中国残疾人证》，填写《在职残疾人登记表》。
　　残疾人就业服务机构根据审核情况为用人单位开具缴费通知单，并加盖审核单位印章。
　　逾期未参加审核的用人单位，视作未安排残疾人就业，残疾人就业服务机构可核定用人单位在职职工总数，确定应缴保障金数额。
　　（三）申报缴纳
　　财政部门依据残疾人就业服务机构开具的缴费通知单，对全部拨款的行政单位和由财政全部补助或部分补助的事业单位，代扣保障金。
　　各类企业（含省属及以上企业）、民办非企业单位以及以经营收入为主要支出来源的事业单位和社会团体，须持残疾人就业服务机构开具的缴费通知单，到主管地税部门申报缴纳。
　　其他用人单位到市残疾人就业服务中心申报缴纳。
　　市财政局、市地税局、市残联可根据实际工作需要，制定具体办法和相关程序。
　　四、征缴管理
　　（一）用人单位缴纳的保障金，机关、社会团体、事业单位在单位公用经费中列支；企业在所得税前列支。
　　（二）保障金属政府基金，纳入预算管理，不得减免。财政部门负责保障金代扣，对已入库保障金的收入、上解、下划等事项管理并记账；残联负责核定用人单位应缴保障金数额，统计欠缴情况，将收入情况记账到缴费单位；地税部门具体负责征收管理。
　　（三）各级财政部门代扣的保障金作为市级收入管理，直接缴入市级国库。
　　各级地税部门代征的保障金作为市级收入管理，直接缴入市级国库。
　　市残疾人就业服务中心征收的保障金作为市级收入管理，直接缴入市级国库。
　　中国人民银行中心支行国库以及各支库，对保障金收入及滞纳金在预算收支科目的1030142“残疾人就业保障金收入”中反映。
　　（四）财政部门代扣的保障金统一使用辽宁省财政厅印制的《一般缴款书》，地税部门代征的保障金使用地税部门的《税收通用缴款书》。
　　（五）凡1994年1月1日至2006年12月31日未缴或未足额缴纳保障金的单位，应予以补缴。补缴金额由同级残 疾人就业服务机构核定，并根据其具体情况确定补缴时限，同时通知财政或地税部门代扣、代征。
　　（六）保障金市县分成办法由市财政局和市残联另行制定。
　　五、有关规定
　　（一）用人单位未按照规定缴纳保障金的，由财政、地税部门责令限期缴纳；逾期仍不缴纳的，除补缴欠缴数额外，还应当自欠缴之日起，按日加收5‰的滞纳金。对拒不缴纳保障金和滞纳金的用人单位，由残疾人就业服务机构申请县级以上人民法院强制执行。
　　（二）用人单位弄虚作假，虚报职工人数和安置残疾人就业人数的，由财政、地税部门依法处理。
　　（三）财政、地税、残联部门应对保障金征收、管理情况定期进行检查，对保障金的征缴、使用要加强管理，建立健全各项手续和管理制度。
　　（四）贪污、挪用、截留、私分保障金的，对相关责任单位、直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员依法给予处分或者处罚；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
　　六、保障金使用管理办法由市财政局会同市残联，按照国家和省有关规定另行制定。
　　七、本办法中具体事宜由大连市财政局、大连市地方税务局及大连市残疾人联合会按各自职责分工负责解释。
　　八、本办法自2008年1月1日起施行。